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given the extensive U.S. experience in coalition warfare and its current austere economic situation, future execution of such an extensive training mission may be as part of a multinational, rather than unilateral, command. The recent U.S. experience in building the partner capacity of the Afghanistan National Security Force as part of a multinational training command offers a distinct view of the magnitude as well as challenges of such a mission. This paper will examine a particular aspect of building partner capacity -the "security force assistance" necessary to create and train an entire armed force from the level of squad to ministry. It will briefly highlight the training mission in Vietnam for historical context, describe how this type of security force assistance mission fits within the contemporary strategic defense guidance, and examine the current multinational training operation in Afghanistan for a better understanding of the operational environment related to these types of missions. Rather than presenting a checklist of lessons learned, it will identify particular challenges related to the host nation and multinational training command to inform those tasked with future efforts of this magnitude. While multicultural themes and multinational operations are the focus of this paper, its primary audience is members of the U.S. In the early days of the assistance mission, the South Vietnamese faced numerous training and organizational challenges. These included a shortage of officers with higher command and staff experience, a deficit in branch qualified officers and noncommissioned officers, a lack of training doctrine, and a scarcity of instructors and actual training facilities. 4 Enduring problems with logistics and maintenance manifested themselves as "overcrowded depots, confused inventories, bottlenecks in local transportation, bureaucratic confusion at the local field supply points, long delays in procuring certain hard-to-manufacture munitions" and a lack of preventative maintenance and absence of spare parts. With the help of its advisors, the Vietnamese National Armed Forces significantly expanded its training efforts from just one recruit training center and ten service schools in 1955 to 33 training centers and 25 service schools in 1970. 8 By this time, MACV had also equipped the majority of the nine infantry divisions, the marine and airborne divisions, and two separate regiments with the "new weapons and equipment specified in the improvement and modernization programs." 9 The efforts of both the training and assistance command and those advisors who "served from the palace level to the [South Vietnamese Army] battalion and the district/subdistrict level in the field" 10 provide a historical example of a large scale military endeavor to build another nation"s entire military from its very roots. In the contemporary security environment, this mission falls within the classification of building partner capacity.
Building Partner Capacity
Released on January 5, 2012, the new Defense Strategic Guidance has fully established building partner capacity as an important element of the current and future U.S. military strategy. Grounded in a strategy to transition from the current conflicts to pending challenges while stewarding limited capital during a time of constrained resources, the strategic guidance describes the conditions, dangers, and opportunities of the worldwide security situation, outlines ten paramount missions for the U.S. Armed
Forces, and details eight principles to steer force and enterprise development. Two of the ten missions address security assistance and building partner capacity. "Provide a
Stabilizing Presence" includes activities to help "build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence." Acknowledging a limitation on resources, the guidance for this mission directs that a "reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity." The associated mission of "Conduct Stability and
Counterinsurgency Operations" emphasizes "non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations." 11 These military-to-military partnerships could include elements of security force assistance, which falls within the doctrinal sphere of stability operations, and includes the organizing, training, equipping, and advising of host-nation security forces. 12 Although the guidance for this mission states that "U.S.
forces will be . . . ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible," it specifies that "forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations" and challenges the military to "retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." In the steering principles that follow the ten mission sets, the strategic guidance recognizes the difficulty of predicting with absolute certitude the changing nature of the strategic environment, cautions against "wholesale divestment of the capability to conduct any Gates" article, he divided this mission set into three distinct categories:
First, building the capacity of current allies and partners with already mature military forces . . . [which requires] routine single service and joint exercise and experimental programs, structures, and agreements to improve force interoperability, leader-exchange programs, and discussions about ways to blend investments and operational capabilities among the alliance or partner nations" militaries . . . Second, fixing the tactical shortcomings of indigenous military forces . . . [which] are the result of institutional deficiencies: a poor training system; an inadequate leader selection and development system; a poor command structure; often weak acquisition, maintenance, supply and logistics systems; and poor personnel policies that result in a corrupt promotion system and insufficient pay and allowances . . . Third, creating both military forces and security institutions from whole cloth . . .
[which] requires a broad enterprise approach that builds security forces simultaneously with creating security ministry proficiency. 16 These three categories represent the wide spectrum of potential requirements needed to assist our various partners of today as well as those of the future. Addressing the force structure required to accomplish these missions, Dubik stated that:
. . . all categories of partner capacity-building missions rely upon singleservice or joint general-purpose forces. Special operations forces have a role to play in each of the three categories, and under certain limited conditions they may be able to execute the second category by themselves. They are insufficient, however, to conduct the kind of exercise program called for in the first category, to execute all of the institutional and supporting system improvements associated with the second category, or to manage the vast enterprise necessary for the third category. 17 The role of conventional forces, which Dubik titled general-purpose forces, in building partner capacity is doctrinally substantiated in the Army"s counterinsurgency manual, which notes:
. . . the mission of developing [Host Nation] security forces goes beyond a task assigned to a few specialists. The scope and scale of training programs today and in the scale of programs likely to be required in the future have grown. While [Foreign Internal Defense] has been traditionally the primary responsibility of the special operations forces (SOF), training foreign forces is now a core competency of regular and reserve units of all Services. 18 Emphasizing the role of the entire Army in the security force assistance mission,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, when he was the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, wrote that "It is clear that we are stronger when we act with partners in today"s operating environment. Therefore, security force assistance is no longer an "additional duty." It is now a core competency of our Army." 19 Dubik illustrated that the sheer magnitude of training an entire foreign military is much more than simply teaching small units of infantry to shoot, move, and communicate:
Not only does this . . . require the creation of a training infrastructuretraining facilities of many types, barracks, and associated headquarters and processes to manage training -to generate security forces, but it also requires putting in place the institutional capacity to recruit, train, acquire, develop, sustain, fund and manage all facets of a nation"s security forces in order to replenish and continually improve those forces. 20 The security force assistance mission of creating and training an entire armed force, consisting of multiple services and branches from the squad to the ministerial level - Cooperation, Programs, and Regional Support were resourced to support these training functions. 22 NTM-A collectively defined the ANA, AAF, and ANP as the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). In addition to training critical combat skills, the command also focused on the crucial missing capabilities of how to "staff, support, and administrate." 23 As of summer 2011, NTM-A and its Afghan counterparts were training Afghan soldiers, airmen, and police at 70 training sites in 21 provinces throughout the country and more than 500 military, law enforcement, and civil service advisors were assisting and advising in the nation"s security ministries. 24 The challenges faced by NTM-A while training the ANSF provide valuable information for future multinational training endeavors and may be broken down into two main categories -those related to the host nation personnel to be trained and those related to the multinational training command itself.
Host Nation Challenges
Officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States Army understand how to train American Soldiers due in no small part to an inherent shared culture and background. However, challenges such as corruption, lack of mechanical aptitude, and illiteracy that are found in other countries may confront these same officers and noncommissioned officers and must be understood and addressed so that they do not endanger the training mission.
The overall absence of corruption in the U.S. military may make it difficult for the advisory personnel to summarily recognize its detrimental effects on the security forces of the host nation and the population they are meant to serve. In their study on Security received "any type of formal driver education" and "many [had] never driven before at all." 32 Driver training does more than merely reduce the amount of equipment loss -it is a force protection measure as well, due to the number of non-battle injuries and fatalities suffered by the host nation security force when there are an insufficient number of trained drivers. 33 In order to improve drivers" skills and emphasize safe vehicle operating procedures, NTM-A increased the duration of driver"s training from one to five weeks. 34 This level of mechanization is just one example of critical demographic factors that must be considered when training indigenous forces.
Literacy may be the most important social statistic for a training and advisory command to understand the basic skill levels of the population from which the security forces will be recruited. Like corruption, it is not a singular issue found in only a small number of countries -according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Literacy training is such a fundamental building block for a trained security force that Lieutenant General Caldwell labeled it the "essential enabler." 39 The connection between the societal challenges found in a host nation and the ability to train its security force must be recognized and understood. Corruption strikes at the very center of unity of command and purpose within the security force and reduces the confidence that the general population must have in its security force.
Levels of mechanization are directly linked to the sophistication of the weaponry and vehicles with which the foreign security force may be equipped. Literacy not only improves the human capital of the security force, but also provides a means with which to reduce corruption and widen the aptitude for mechanization.
Training Command Challenges
The constraints encountered in working in a multinational environment are widely Identifying all of the security requirements for the host nation is a critical aspect of determining the composition of the security forces. While the military members of the training command logically understand the militarized entities of the foreign security forces that they are training, this understanding does not always translate to the host nation police forces that play such a critical role in providing security for the populace and supporting the "clear, hold, and build" phases of the counterinsurgency.
Complicating this even more is the fact that there is rarely just a singular police force to be trained. The ANP consists of four main entities: the Afghan Uniformed Police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, the Afghan Border Police, and the Afghan AntiCrime Police. Major General Walter M. Golden, Jr., NTM-A Deputy Commander for Police, described these entities as:
 The Afghan Uniformed Police are the regular police that patrol villages, provinces and roads. The AUP is in all 34 provinces and has 90,500 members.
 The Afghan National Civil Order Police is a national level response force, used for counterinsurgency and civil order. ANCOP has 11,700 members.
 The 20,000 member-strong Afghan Border Police provide border security with posts and customs operations around the nation.
 The Afghan Anti-Crime Police investigate crimes and functions as police intelligence. The AACP has over 3,400 members. 41 In their study Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, Terrence K. Kelly, Nora
Bensahel, and Olga Oliker note that ". . . other U.S. government agencies have not been able to provide police training on a large scale in active conflict zones. This task has often fallen to the U.S. military by default; absent substantial changes in the capacities of other U.S. agencies, it will almost certainly fall to the Army in the future." 42 The challenge of training such police forces is compounded by the lack of a standardized U.S. national police that could be called upon to assist in this mission.
Participating in a multinational command has directly addressed this need, as numerous troop contributing nations have contributed the professional police needed to train the Afghans on both traditional rule of law functions as well as the paramilitary skills that are necessary for a police force operating in a counterinsurgency environment. Italian
Carabinieri, French Gendarmerie, Romanian Jendarma, and Spanish Guardia Civil, to name but a few, provide a police, not military, based focus to the training for those who will be responsible for the day-to-day security and protection of the population.
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The instruction of Afghan police also provides an excellent example of how a multinational command may need to engage external actors outside the command and direct control of the training mission to maximize capabilities and results. For six years, the police training environment was one in which:
multiple bilateral police training initiatives created a lack of unity of effort in the police training function. German, US State Department, US Department of Defense, European Union (EU) and other contributing nations conducted various forms of police training. The result lacked a coherent strategy, unity of effort and defined leadership. Each nation brought their own funding, national standards and techniques, and national caveats resulting in a confusing array of training initiatives for the Afghan National Police. The development of the police force is just one aspect of training and advising a national security force. As Dubik noted in his article, building a national security force from the "whole cloth" is a massive endeavor that must include all facets of recruiting, to include manning and resourcing the recruiters, building the induction centers, and establishing and developing the recruiting command. All aspects of training, to include training and resourcing the drill instructors, fabricating the individual and collective training centers, and creating the training and doctrine command, must occur.
Paramount in this process is the thought given to the force structure to be built and trained and the identification of the capabilities that will be needed by that force. That the ANA was "originally built as an infantry-centric force" 46 Department of Defense civil servants serve as senior advisors in the security ministries to capitalize on their "unique insight and expertise for running a large military organization" and bring a depth of knowledge to the ministries. 49 The importance of these senior advisors cannot be understated -while the indigenous soldiers and police learn their trade at the training and fielding centers, it is the ability of the officers and civilians of the General Staff and security ministries to employ some form of the programming, budgeting, and planning process that will enable this leadership to grow, manage, and sustain the security forces.
By the very essence of the mission, a training and advisory command is provisional in nature and will change shape and organization over time to provide the needed support to the maturing host nation security forces. As temporary training sites move to permanent training centers and training institutions evolve, the training command"s focus, functions, and priorities will also shift. This is best evidenced by the role of the NTM-A in the train-the-trainer process. NTM-A trainers were first utilized to train the large number of Afghan recruits needed to man the expanding security force.
As the ANSF began to grow, NTM-A shifted a portion of its trainers to begin training Afghans to serve as the primary recruit trainers. In the past year, 453 ANP instructors and 1,396 ANA instructors were trained and certified to lead police and army training.
Afghan instructors training Afghan recruits is a key element of the "effort to create a selfgenerating and self-sustaining system that can be maintained by the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defense." 50 Since fewer NTM-A trainers were needed to conduct recruit training, NTM-A was able to again shift trainers to instruct Afghan leaders on how to manage, resource, and sustain the training infrastructure located at the various training centers and institutions.
Understanding the challenges that a training command will encounter -that the command will change structure and focus over time, that developing senior level institutions is critical to establishing an enduring force, that building an entire national security force is a vast requirement requiring significant resources, to include time, and that the military training mission will include non-traditional aspects such as training police -is just as critical as recognizing the inherent challenges that levels of corruption, mechanization, and literacy present in the host nation. Cultures and international partners will differ in future missions, but those responsible must have a framework with which to consider the indigenous forces to be trained and the training command to be organized. If the U.S. Army again receives the mission to train a foreign military, it must begin with an appreciation of these challenges.
Conclusion
The Army"s current security force assistance training and doctrine represent a significant commitment to the partner capacity building mission. In the past decade, the Army has gained considerable experience from working with host nation forces and has written this experience into its doctrine. Field Manual (FM) 3-07. The new Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes the enduring nature of this mission to build partner capacity and makes it clear that "large-scale, prolonged stability operations" are not envisioned for the near term. However, the "generational spike"
frequency of such a training mission may occur sooner, rather than later, in the spectrum of time, emerging in some unforeseen trouble spot. The recent suggestions of military training assistance for a post-Gaddafi Libya only serve to highlight the speed with which such a mission could appear. 55 The manner in which these mission requirements develop will only increase in the future -just as "today"s backwater may become tomorrow"s flashpoint" in the operational sense, today"s flashpoint may very well become tomorrow"s training and advisory requirement. 
